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
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Tactical Exercises of Air Defense Large Units with Field Firing

General-Mayor Y. Remek,
Chief of the Air and Air Defense Forces
of the Country and Deputy Minister of National Defense
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Tactical exercises of air defense large units with field firing have major significance in the overall system of training of the air defense forces of the country. Therefore, every article on this topic meets with great interest. The fact is that this kind of exercise helps improve the training of troops under the most complex conditions where several different types of jamming are produced for the purpose of maximally reducing—the effectiveness of the air defense.

In one of the articles in <u>Information Collection No. 2 (1971)</u> in which all the aspects of the organization and conduct of such exercises were examined in detail, the author put forth a very correct requirement: to ensure the teamwork and high degree of training of all the branch arms within the framework of a large unit of the air defense of the country, and also effective control of their actions by the commander and staff of the large unit while warding off the air enemy.

Such conditions, as we know, have not managed to be provided at national training grounds. The situation created in tactical exercises at times has not corresponded to probable enemy actions, and field firing, in view of the complexity of organizing it, has not been conducted at all. And on the whole such exercises have not by any means completed the operational-tactical training of troops.

One of the reasons for the inadequate level of the tactical exercises of the large units of the air defense of the country has also been the fact that we have not had the capability of planning their conduct in places of permanent deployment, for we could not produce intensive combined jamming and carry out the launching of cruise missiles.

It should also be noted that the missile firings of the surface-to-air missile troops and fighter aviation were accomplished by separate units,

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and, consequently, the commanders and crews of the command posts of the large units of the air defense of the country were only to a limited degree familiarized with the experience acquired during the conduct of them.

Conducting exercises on a training ground of the USSR presents the possibility of creating a complex air situation, if only for the short period in which it is required to conduct combat actions with all the air defense forces of the country (from large unit to separate subunit). We thereby increase the responsibility of the crews of the command posts of all branch arms for the fulfilment of the combat task, which is an important part of the morale and psychological training of personnel.

Objective treatment of the results of each exercise, including missile firings of the surface-to-air missile units and the fighter aviation as an inseparable part of a tactical exercise of a large unit of the air defense of the country, not only affords the opportunity of fairly evaluating the trainees but also allows detecting the reasons for existing shortcomings.

We approach the preparation and conduct of the tactical exercises of air defense large units with great responsibility. The future plan for firings by surface-to-air missile troops and fighter aviation has been newly examined and reserves have been found so that these exercises can be conducted regularly, at definite periods and under complex conditions. Use of RM-207 targets, which can simulate the most complex conditions, is planned on a large scale.

At the same time, we consider it necessary to continue training staffs to know how to accomplish their tasks under conditions of a fast-changing situation and in a very short time. The struggle to shorten the time to complete this or that operation in the air defense forces of the country must be one of the basic methods of training them. Therefore it is very useful to teach commanders to work with the use of automated means of control, with which it is possible to wage a decisive struggle to save time in the process of control and simultaneously increase its effectiveness.

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